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Abstract 
 
This paper compares the effectiveness of public CCTV systems according to 
meta-reviews, with what might be expected based upon theoretical 
predictions. The apparent gulf between practice and prediction is explored in 
the light of the challenges faced by CCTV operators in terms of effective 
target selection. In addition, counter-intuitive reactions by members of the 
public to situational symbols of crime deterrence may also undermine the 
efficacy of CCTV. Evidence is introduced and reviewed that suggests CCTV 
operators may employ implicit profiles to select targets. Essentially, young, 
scruffy males who appear to be loitering are disproportionately targeted 
compared with their base rate use of surveyed areas. However, the extent to 
which such a profile is diagnostic of criminal intent or behaviour is unclear. 
Such profiles may represent little more than ‘pattern matching’ within an 
impoverished visual medium. Finally, suggestions for future research and 
effective CCTV operator practice are offered in order to improve target 
selection. 
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Open street public CCTV systems are an ever-present feature of the modern 
urban landscape. Although current accurate figures are hard to find, it has 
been estimated that there are some 4.2 million cameras in the UK (Norris 
and McCahill, 2006; McCahill and Norris, 2003). This figure gives some 
flavour of just how far CCTV has come since the first large scale open 
public space system was deployed on the busy sea front of Bournemouth in 
1985 (Norris, McCahill and Wood, 2004), to today where it is a ubiquitous 
feature of the modern urban and criminal justice landscape.  
 
The growth of CCTV systems in the UK over the last two decades has been 
due in no small part to its perceived benefits. Public support for CCTV 
systems, as expressed in surveys, has been remarkably high (typically 80-
90% ‘happy’ with CCTV; Spriggs, Gill, Argomaniz, and Bryan, 2005; 
Geake, 1993) although substantial methodological issues do cast a shadow 
over this apparent support (Ditton 2000; Ditton, 1998). Critical incidents 
such as the tragic case of the murdered toddler Jamie Bulger have done 
much to accelerate both public and Governmental support for CCTV 
systems, probably because such systems can come to represent a tangible 
response and symbol of action in the ‘war on crime’ (Norris and McCahill, 
2006).  
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Despite the apparent appeal of public CCTV, the efficiency of such systems 
in terms of crime deterrence and reduction has received somewhat mixed 
support. A major review undertaken by Welsh and Farrington (2002) 
examined 13 studies where levels of crime were compared between 
locations where CCTV had been introduced and a suitable control area. 
Outcome measures concerned a range of crimes, and the CCTV 
interventions were rated as having had one of four types of effect (measured 
on average 10.9 months after the CCTV systems were introduced). The 
results of this review are listed in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. A summary of the Welsh and Farrington (2002, table 3.1) CCTV 
review results. 
 
Type of Effect Definition of Effect Studies 
Desirable Effect Significant Decrease in Crime 5 
Undesirable Effect Significant Increase in Crime 3 
Null Effect Evidence of No Effect on Crime 4 
Uncertain Effect Unclear Evidence of Effect on Crime 1 
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As can be seen in table 1, a decrease in crime is not found in the majority of 
studies that met the strict criteria for inclusion in the review, indeed, three 
studies actually found that crime had increased following the introduction of 
CCTV and a further four found no effect.  
 
The somewhat mixed findings described above stand in contrast to the 
theoretical predictions in respect of CCTV. Researchers have outlined a 
number of ways in which CCTV might help to reduce crime (e.g., Armitage, 
2002; Armitage, 1999; Welsh and Farrington, 2002). Such predictions may 
be divided using the traditional distinction between formal  (official) and 
informal regulation. Informal factors include those aspects of the community 
and encounters with individuals within public spaces that might affect the 
behaviour of both potential victims and offenders alike. For example, if 
more people start to use a public space newly covered by CCTV then this 
may enhance natural surveillance between members of the public and so 
deter offenders (Jacobs, 1961). This may also improve social cohesion 
within public spaces and the perceived efficacy of its inhabitants to intervene 
when the need arises (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). Potential 
offenders may also be deterred as a result of the panopticon effect of CCTV 
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(Norris, 2003; Reeve, 1998; Foucault, 1977; Bentham, 1787). This concerns 
the way in which CCTV observation represents asymmetrical surveillance 
such that one may be aware that one could be seen, yet not be in a position 
to verify this. One cannot watch the watcher and so continual and 
internalised self-discipline becomes an appropriate response on the part of 
potential offenders. For victims too, the presence of CCTV may represent a 
symbol of law and order that both encourages resistance when faced with 
offences in public, and greater precaution with possessions and behaviour.  
This is because CCTV may serve to remind people that crime is an ever-
present problem and others with whom they share public spaces may not be 
trusted (Williams, 2007; Armitage, 2002). 
 
Aside from informal factors that affect potential victims and offenders 
without the direct intervention of officials, there are also factors that directly 
involve officials or those with formal authority, such as when the police use 
recorded images to identify suspects in subsequent investigations. And 
again, the efficient deployment of police or other formal resources via 
CCTV coordinated operations might be expected to aid detection. Live 
monitoring of CCTV images may also mean that officials can intervene 
early in an escalation sequence to both avert more serious crimes and 
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capture perpetrators who might otherwise be hard to detect after the event 
(Welsh and Farrington, 2002). In these formal matters, CCTV might act as 
the means via which a ‘capable guardian’ may respond to the ‘motivated 
offender’ (Felson, 2000; Clarke and Felson, 1993). Salient CCTV systems 
may be one situational aspect that the potential offender ought to take 
account of before choosing to commit crime (Clarke, 1995). An illustrated 
summary of the ways in which CCTV systems might deter or reduce crime 
is shown in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. An illustrated model of how CCTV may affect crime. 
 
Despite the intuitively appealing array of arguments that can be marshalled 
in defence of CCTV efficiency, it remains the case, as summarised in table 
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1, that such systems often fall short in this respect. On the informal side, in 
terms of both victims and potential offenders, research that describes (rather 
than predicts) people's attitudes towards CCTV helps explain some of the 
‘inefficiencies’. For example, members of the public, as potential victims, 
may become habituated to the symbols of CCTV as a deterrence measure. 
Although Gill and Spriggs (2005) found a positive correlation between an 
awareness of cameras and their density, this correlation was not significant. 
Without being in special need of CCTV, people may simply not attend to 
these devices in a way that would affect their risk-taking behaviour (Ditton, 
2000). What is more, such habituation also calls into question the 
‘panopticon’ effect upon self-discipline. How can people respond 
appropriately to a disciplinary gaze if they are barely paying any attention to 
it, especially in the case of spontaneous crimes of the moment? Indeed, 
when noticed, such measures may even symbolise the danger that an area 
presents, and therefore undermine people’s willingness to inhabit it and so 
offer informal regulation (Williams, 2007; Ditton, 2000; Jacobs, 1961).  
Finally, cameras may also present the illusory impression that any incident is 
already under observation and so reduce the likelihood that bystanders will 
intervene independently during a crisis (Latane and Darley, 1976). In 
essence, such as there is any effect, people seem as likely to ‘ignore or 
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withdraw’ in response to CCTV, rather than become newly emboldened, 
self-disciplined, and informal regulators of public spaces.  
 
Limitations Affecting the CCTV Mediated Construction of Suspicion 
 
It is also possible that there may be some shortcomings evident in practice 
on the formal/official side too. As Norris and McCahill (2006) insightfully 
point out, there is often a gulf between abstract conceptions of how such 
CCTV systems may operate, and actual practice on the ground, which tends 
to be characterised by ‘the selective concerns of the operators’ (p19). 
Ultimately, it is not machinery that decides what constitutes an event or 
object worthy of monitoring in anticipation of potential further action; it is a 
human operator, acting within a workplace context and guided by pre-
existing stereotypes and conceptions of who and what is normal in a given 
location (Smith, 2004; Norris and Armstrong, 1999). So it seems reasonable 
to ask, how capable is the ordinary ‘capable guardian’ that actually monitors 
CCTV screens? 
 
Smith (2004 p391) points out that CCTV systems still largely rely on the 
“human element to both monitor and control cameras” and that despite 
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some exceptions, this remains a neglected area of research.  The CCTV 
screen observer faces a challenging task. The information upon which they 
must decide whether a target individual is or is not potentially deviant is 
relatively impoverished. Firstly, the surveillance is asymmetrical, in that the 
target cannot respond dynamically to a disciplinary gaze, via sound or visual 
modes, and this may distort the impression that targets give of themselves. 
For example, when a person knows for sure that they are being watched by 
an authority figure, they can modify their behaviour accordingly, and they 
can correct any impression that is open to misinterpretation, whether they 
are ‘deviant’ or not. This is part of everyday face work (Goffman, 1967) and 
helps make clear what a situation means for all those involved. Further, as 
no sound channel is generally present from target to monitor (although a trial 
using this is being run in Holland, Sunday Times November 26, 2006) 
innocent good-humoured communication may be confused with an 
aggressive interaction and visa versa.  Finally, the specific nature of certain 
types of visual images may cause robust biases in person perception that 
result in the over-attribution of primed or expected traits within the target.  
For example, in a number of studies Daniel Lassiter and colleagues have 
shown that observers are more likely to attribute guilty intentions to a target 
within a video clip if the shot focuses on the person to the exclusion of the 
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full situation they face (for a review see Lassiter, Geers, Munhall, Handley, 
and Beers, 2001). In essence, once selected, the very act of focussing in on 
an individual may render the viewer prone to a guilt attribution bias and 
therefore less likely to deselect the target from view (and so fail to attend 
appropriately to other participants in a scene). 
 
In the light of the foregoing difficulties it is hardly surprising that CCTV 
operators face a daunting task when deciding who (or what) to select for 
legitimate monitoring; the technical mediation of the stimulus information 
itself may render the task much harder than it would be in ‘real life’. 
Hopefully, CCTV operators can improve over time in terms of identifying 
what visual behaviour is and is not diagnostic of current or further serious 
criminal activity. As yet no research has compared target selection efficiency 
against operator experience; although research suggests that undoing the 
tendency to over-attribute negative dispositional inferences towards a target 
is particularly difficult when one expects to see immoral or antisocial 
behaviour (Gawronski, 2004; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, and 
Trafimow, 2002; for a review see: Skowronski, Carlston, 1989). The extent 
to which robust biases in person perception associated with remote visual 
images can be compensated for by direct experience of target selection 
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outcomes, remains for the moment something of an open question, and one 
deserving of further attention in this applied context. 
 
Of course, even where all modal channels are available, in real situations 
unmediated by visual images, such as where a police officer needs to 
separate the suspicious from the innocent citizen, it is hard to form an 
accurate judgement of deception (Vrij, 2004) or involvement in crime 
(Dunham, Alpert, Stronshine, and Bennett, 2005). Dunham et al., (2005) had 
observers follow 132 police officer duty tours in Georgia (USA) and found 
that an officer would ‘form a suspicion’ of a member of the public on just 
1.32 occasions during any one shift (M=1.32, SD=1.27). The reason for this 
suspicion was coded into four categories as follows; information about a 
suspect or situation (18.4%), a person out of time and place (9.8%), 
inappropriate overt behaviour (66%), and distinctive appearance (5.7%).  On 
59% of occasions the officer decided to stop the citizen based upon their 
suspicion. Once falling under suspicion, there was no significant correlation 
between the decision to stop and any broad demographic feature of the 
suspect such as age, gender, race, or class (although demographic factors are 
of course strong predictors of involvement in the CJS generally in the UK 
and USA, HO Statistical Bulletin 2005, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 
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2007).  However, there was a significant positive correlation between the 
decision to make a stop, and the initial behaviour of the suspect 
(r=0.393***). In other words, once a person had attracted the attention of an 
officer, the suspect’s behaviour was the best predictor of whether the officer 
would go on to stop them.  In an ongoing setting where a potential suspect 
has the capacity to see and respond to an authority figure, behaviour 
becomes an important predictor of the decision to stop, and the outcome of 
the stop. It is worth contrasting this situation with that of the potential 
suspect who may be selected for a CCTV surveillance pursuit. Here the 
target can give no dynamic response to the attention of a watcher, even if 
this could be noticed. The modestly intoxicated cannot appear to straighten 
themselves up and so look distinct from the dangerously drunk person, the 
temporarily uninhibited reveller cannot modify their demeanour to seem 
separate from those determined to take things to excess, and so forth. Even 
when suspect predictive behaviour is evident on the screen, the asocial 
nature of an asymmetrical gaze of which the target may have little if any 
awareness may undermine the discriminative value of such information. 
Remote visual surveillance may provide more opportunities for CCTV 
operators to observe and record examples of antisocial behaviour because 
this is unhindered by the physical presence of an authority figure. However, 
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whether target selection based upon such 'uninhibited' sub-criminal 
behaviour will lead to an efficient level of positive identifications of 
subsequent serious deviant actions is as yet an unresolved matter and open to 
question based upon the current state of the literature. In sum, people’s 
behaviour can be a poor indicator of legitimate suspicion in the presence of 
proxy symbols of authority, and this may be one additional reason why 
monitored CCTV systems are not as effective as might be expected. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the Dunham et al., (2005) study outlined 
above, police officers had a basis to form suspicion a little over once every 
shift, perhaps far less than might be imagined. Similarly, Simon (2004) 
reports on the CCTV control room practices of a large educational institution 
and notes also that for most of the time, “(observers face)…an extremely 
long time…sitting staring at essentially nothing” (p388).  Further, Norris and 
McCahill (2006) found that ‘proactive’ use of a CCTV system in a South 
London shopping mall was uncommon (i.e., there were 84 targeted 
surveillance pursuits over 120 hours of control room observation, just over 5 
per shift). In addition, many of those targeted surveillance episodes that do 
take place seldom result in the need to deploy the police (45 times out of 
900; Norris and Armstrong, 1999). In other words, for most of the time 
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CCTV operators watch very ordinary and familiar scenes, for long periods, 
punctuated by relatively rare incidents judged worthy of pursuit, which most 
often end without the need for further action.  
 
 
CCTV and Implicit Suspect Profiles 
 
Unlike police officers on duty, operators have fewer means of avoiding 
boredom. They may be faced with little in the way of distinctive events or 
behaviour to view, and that which does occur may not be diagnostic of 
deviant behaviour (thus leading to futile pursuits of the innocuous). Under 
these circumstances perhaps the only criteria that an operator may use to 
determine who to watch when they actively choose to do so is going to be 
either the target’s visual appearance or prior information and knowledge 
about a specific person.  
 
Only a few studies have addressed the question of who is selected for 
observation within a CCTV control room; these include: Norris and 
McCahill (2006), Lomell (2004), Smith (2004), McCahill (2002), Wakefield 
(2000), and Norris and Armstrong (1999; 1997). The results of these studies 
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generally show that it is ‘the usual suspects’- those that fit certain 
demographic profiles, such as age, gender and race in a manner that fits with 
pre-existing stereotypes related to crime tend to be picked out.  For example, 
Norris and Armstrong (1997) found that CCTV operators disproportionately 
targeted young blacks and males, while Norris and McCahill (2006), Lomell 
(2004), Smith (2004) and Wakefield (2000) found that the young and those 
that appeared to be ‘flawed consumers’ (scruffy or dressed to fit a youth sub-
cultural group) were more likely to become a target than others. Such 
findings have obvious implications for the effective use of CCTV as well as 
unjust deviance amplification processes affecting certain groups and those 
on the economic margins of society (Norris and Armstrong, 1997; Cohen, 
1972). 
 
One difficulty with the foregoing studies concerns making accurate 
comparisons between who is targeted by CCTV operators against who was 
actually using the area at the time. That is to say the target demographic 
profile needs to be compared against who is actually using the area at the 
time in order to be sure that the apparent distortions in target selection are 
due to operator bias and not base rate effects associated with the type of 
people that choose to use the area at a given time (for similar observations in 
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which suspect selection profiles are adjusted according to their base rate use 
of a location see, Parker, MacDonald, Alpert, Smith, and Piquero, 2004; 
Meehan and Ponder, 2002). In order to combat this problem, a researcher 
working with the author of this paper observed CCTV operator behaviour 
within a control room and compared target selection profiles with 
demographic information about who was actually using the area under 
surveillance at the time. Details of the control room will remain anonymous 
for the purposes of this paper, but it was situated in a major metropolitan 
conurbation in the South of England and funded under a Town Centre 
Management Scheme partnership (TCMs, involving the local borough, 
retailers, chamber of commerce, businesses, landowners, with the local 
police authority in overall control).  
 
The control room was equipped with 12 monitor screens fed by 42 pan tilt 
and zoom (PTZ) cameras which were located in and around the central 
commercial area of the borough. The main screen image was recorded in  
‘real’ time and was positioned in the centre, and images from other screens 
could be directed to this at the operators’ discretion.  Contact with private 
shop security staff, shop staff and the police could be made via phone, 
mobile phone and radio equipment at the console.  A computer was also 
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housed at the console, and this gave operators access to a local police 
computer database that held photos and a small amount of information about 
local ‘known offenders’. There were 5 operators that worked in the control 
room in shifts.  
 
For 5 days in one week between the hours of 9.00am to 5.00pm the 
researcher coded a range of details about the targets that were selected for 
observation, including how long they were pursued and the reason given or 
volunteered for the pursuit.  In the week following this coding the researcher 
went to typical locations under surveillance by the system. The range of 
public street settings were selected to avoid any potential confounds and to 
be as representative of the type of scenes observed in the control room in the 
previous week as possible. The coder then recorded demographic 
information about who was using these areas until the n of observations 
matched that for the total of the previous week. This information was then 
used in order to compare target profile information with the demographic 
profile of those that actually use the surveyed area. The descriptive results of 
this exercise appear in table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. Counts for CCTV target and area use by demographic groups 
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Demographic CCTV Targetsa  Area Usersb Difference (a-b) 
Gender    
Male n (%) 132   (73.7) 081  (45)  51 
Female 047   (26.3) 099  (55) -52 
Age    
10-20 042  (23.5) 016  (08.9)  26 
21-30 081  (45.3) 047  (26.1)  34 
31-40 028  (15.6) 039  (21.7) -11 
41-50 015  (08.4) 042  (23.3) -27 
51-60+ 013  (07.3) 036  (20.0) -23 
Ethnicity     
White 163  (91.1) 168  (93.3) -5 
Black 011  (06.1) 006  (03.3)  5 
Asian  004  (02.2) 004  (02.2)  0 
Chinese 001  (00.6) 002  (01.1) -1 
Other 000  (00.0) 000  (00.0)  0 
Appearance    
Scruffy 087  (48.6) 025  (13.9)  62 
Sub-Cultural 004  (02.2) 000  (00.0)  4 
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Casual 077  (43.0) 132  (73.3) -55 
Smart 011  (06.1) 023  (12.8) -12 
 
An analysis of data presented in table 2 show that cell frequencies for gender 
differed significantly (X2=30.7, df=1, p<0.001) as did age (X2=46.1, df=4, 
p<0.001) and appearance (X2=57.0, df=3, p<0.001). However the 
frequencies for ethnicity did not differ significantly across observation 
locations (X2=1.88, df=3, n.s).  As can be seen from the table, after 
adjustment is made for who uses the area under surveillance, a target is more 
likely to be a young male of scruffy appearance. The most common reason 
given for the initial target being selected (by the CCTV operator) was 
‘loitering'. The typical duration for target pursuit was 91.07 seconds and 
interestingly there was a significant difference in pursuit duration between 
males (M=100.83, SD=130.28) and females (M=63.65, SD=83.33) with 
males being observed for significantly longer than females (t[127.1]=2.36, 
p<0.05).  
 
The foregoing results are somewhat limited by the fact that coding was only 
undertaken between 9.00 am and 5pm on weekdays. It is possible, indeed 
likely, that the demographic profile of those using the areas in question 
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would change markedly on (for example) a Saturday night, and it is not 
possible to say whether base rate adjusted target profiles would remain 
constant outside the hours that were tested here. However, the results 
covering the time period in question do support previous findings in that 
young males of ‘scruffy’ appearance are the most likely to be selected for 
pursuit. And what is important here is that this remains the case even after 
carefully controlling for the demographic profile of who is using the area at 
the time target selections are made. Of course, it is also not possible to say 
whether this means that operators depend entirely upon simple visual cues 
related to demographic and social-economic factors in order to select targets, 
because target behaviour is confounded with target type in this and (almost 
certainly) other studies.  Moreover, data related to the outcome of a pursuit 
in comparison to those in a scene who are not selected for pursuit is not 
available. We simply cannot know whether those in the field that escape the 
attention of a CCTV operator are more or less likely to be involved in crime. 
To put it another way, until a yoked sample of ‘older women of smart 
appearance’ are approached and questioned by the police in the way a 
typical target might be at the end of a suspicious pursuit period, then it is not 
possible to say that the profile which is being used, confounded as it is by 
behaviour, is not a reasonable basis for selecting targets in these 
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circumstances. It may yet prove diagnostic of criminal intent. That said, little 
in terms of the outcome of pursuits, which seldom require further action, or 
the overall efficacy of CCTV systems as described in the review above, 
would suggest that target selection has high discriminant validity, and 
therefore that either behaviour or basic demographic features are good 
predictors of criminal activity.  In essence, operators do in practice appear to 
employ implicit suspect/target profiles, and these concern specific 
demographic groups displaying certain types of behaviour such as loitering. 
However, whether such profiles are themselves diagnostic of significant 
criminal behaviour, remains open to question.  
 
Conclusion: Improving Target Selection 
 
Current training for public space CCTV operators in the UK falls under the 
control of the Security Industry Authority (SIA), which oversees the 
awarding of licenses (Public Space Surveillance) to CCTV operators under 
statutory powers given in the Private Security Industries Act (2001) and 
regulation orders (2007: 810; Licenses). Training in CCTV practice leading 
to eligibility for a license to engage in PSS CCTV activity typically involves 
30 hours teaching and assessment (e.g., those offered by EDEXCEL 2007 
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and ASTS). As an example the ASTS course covers the following topics: 
 
Role and responsibilities of CCTV operator and other CCTV staff 
Codes of practice, operational procedures and guidelines 
CCTV equipment and its operation 
Control room communications and access control 
Legislation 
Dealing with incidents 
Surveillance techniques 
Fire and emergency procedures 
Health and safety 
 
Notice that surveillance techniques, which are relevant here, are but one 
aspect of CCTV use. Under this same sub heading on the BTEC 
EDEXCELL (2007) program, tutors of PSS CCTV operators are invited to 
discuss with students (among other things) “how to recognize and interpret 
body language” and the “reasons and methods used when targeting” (p27).  
In respect of the former point, it is important that this refers to clear 
examples of actual criminal behaviour, as the research literature regarding 
the construction of suspicion based upon non-verbal gestures provides little 
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hope that either expertise, training or any specific gestures viewed from 
close up, let alone at a distance and to the possible exclusion of context, is a 
reliable indicator of criminal intent and deception (Vrij, 2004; Mann, Vrij & 
Bull, 2002,). What is more, certain non-verbal gesture styles are associated 
with specific demographic groups, and this fact alone may explain some 
biases in target selection (for example, innocent African Americans have 
been found to use more hand gestures and smiles during encounters with 
authority figures than Caucasians; Johnson, 2007). As to the other point 
concerning the reasons and methods used to select targets, the descriptive 
evidence reviewed above suggests that what is employed in practice may 
involve a simple pattern matching exercise in which targets that fit the 
existing offender population profile (i.e., young males; HO Statistical 
Bulletin, 2005) are over-selected. That is to say, despite training which 
cautions against selecting targets based upon demographic group 
membership, that is what happens in practice. The question remains as to 
whether such targeting is due to pre-existing negative social stereotypes; 
behaviour and gestures (non-criminal) that are associated with certain 
demographic groups; or may in fact be entirely legitimate based upon pursuit 
outcomes.  The problem here is that as yet no evidence exists that has 
adequately addressed this question. This is because outcomes for non-
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selected targets have yet to be examined in a study that also allows for the 
base rate use of the surveyed area by certain demographic groups. However, 
this sort of comprehensive research is valuable for two reasons. 1., because it 
might help explain why CCTV systems are not as effective at crime 
detection and deterrence as might be expected and so feed into CCTV 
operator training, and 2., because the illegitimate over-selection of specific 
demographic groups may lead to unjust deviance amplification (Norris and 
Armstrong, 1997; Cohen, 1972). It may also be that when it comes to crime, 
the CCTV medium is sufficiently impoverished compared with real 
encounters with individuals on the street that whatever other uses it may be 
put to, when it comes to selecting potential offenders based upon legitimate 
suspicion, CCTV operators will always face challenges that can be seriously 
underestimated. There is a sense in which CCTV systems never fail; they 
continue to present and record images on screens using reliable and 
sophisticated technology. The real issue concerns whether such systems are 
always the most effective means of dealing with crime in public places, and 
if so, are the users of such systems able to take full advantage of this? 
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